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How much do tax credits  affect firms’ R&D activities? What are the  mechanisms? Few 
empirical studies directly examine the effect of tax credit policies on firms’ R&D investments 
and the importance of financial constraints on the policy effects on R&D. This paper examines 
the effect of the Japanese tax credit reform in 2003 on firms’ R&D investments by exploiting 
cross-firm variation in the changes in the effective tax credit rate between 2002 and 2003. 
Regression results suggest a significantly positive effect of the change in the effective tax credit 
rate on corporate R&D investments. Across different specifications, the estimated (semi-) 
elasticity of R&D investments  with respect to the  effective tax credit rate is 2.3  with  an 
approximate  standard error of 0.6. We also examine the policy implications of financial 
constraints on R&D investments and find that the effect of tax credits is significantly larger for 
firms with relatively large outstanding debt. 
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How much does tax credit aect rm's R&D activity? What are mechanisms? Since R&D has
some characteristics of a public good, government subsidy to R&D investment could be justiable
to bridge the gap between the private and social rate of return. Further, R&D investment plays
an important role for long-run economic growth (Romer (1986); Aghion and Howitt (1997)).
Therefore, understanding the mechanisms through which tax policies aect R&D investment is
a prerequisite for designing eective growth-promoting tax policies.
R&D investment may be dicult to nance through external funds due to proprietary in-
formation, highly uncertain returns, and lack of collateral value for R&D capital (see Arrow
(1962)).1 When rms do not hold sucient internal funds, R&D investment may be restricted
due to nancial constraint. From this viewpoint, tax credit may promote R&D investment not
only through increasing the private return from R&D investment but also through relaxing the
nancial constraint for R&D expenditure. While a small number of empirical studies provide
micro-level evidence for nancial constraint for R&D investment (see Hall (2002) and Brown
et al. (2009)), few empirical studies directly examine the eect of tax credit policy change on
rm's R&D investment and quantify the importance of nancial constraints in explaining the
policy eect on R&D. This paper lls this gap by carefully examining the eect of Japanese tax
credit reform in 2003 on rm's R&D expenditure.
In the tax reform of 2003, Japanese government introduced a total tax credit system which
substantially increased the amount of aggregate tax credit from the incremental tax credit
system that were in eect until 2002. In the incremental system, rms can apply tax credit
only if R&D expenditure in the current accounting year is greater than the base level which
is roughly the average of R&D expenditure over the last 5 years.2 Tax credit before 2002 is
only a fraction of the increment in R&D expenditure, approximately equal to 15 percent of the
dierence between the current year's R&D expenditure and the average of the last 5 years. In
the total tax credit system, tax credit is on total expenditure. Because tax credit depends on
previous R&D expenditure under the incremental system, changes in the eective rate of tax
credits due to the 2003 reform vary across rms. The rms with high R&D expenditure prior
to 2002 experienced a large increase in the eect rate of tax credits in 2003. On the other hand,
the eective rate of tax credits remain the same between 2002 and 2003 for those without any
R&D expenditure prior to 2002.
To understand how the 2003 tax credit reform aect rm's R&D investment, we also develop a
simple model of R&D investment and examine the optimal investment policy. First, even though
the shift from the incremental to total tax credit system increases credit substantially, it does
not necessarily aect R&D investment if the current R&D expenditure is greater than the base
1See also Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Ogawa (2007).
2See Section 3 for details.
2level dened in the incremental system. This is because investment is determined by equating
marginal benet and marginal cost, and the tax credit reform does not change either of them
in such a case. However, once we take into account the possibility of nancial constraint, the
tax reform may potentially have a large eect on R&D investment. When nancial constraint
is binding without being able to raise external funds for R&D, an increase in tax credit may
increase the available internal funds one-to-one and, as a result, it could increase R&D investment
substantially.
By using the variation across rms in the changes in the eective rate of tax credits between
2002 and 2003, we estimate the elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to the eective rate
of tax credit and examine empirical validity of the nancial constraint mechanism. Motivated
by Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Bloom, Grith, and Van Reenen (2002), and Brown et al
(2009), we specify a linear model of R&D investment with possible interaction terms between
the eective rate of tax credit and the measure of nancial constraint. The model is estimated by
using rm-level panel data from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities
with a proxy we construct for the eective rate of tax credit under Japanese tax credit system.
Regression results suggest the signicantly positive eect of the change in the eective rate
of tax credit on corporate R&D investment. Our OLS estimate for the elasticities of the eective
rate of tax credit on R&D investment is 2.3 percent with the standard errors of around 0.6. These
results imply that the tax reform of 2003 had substantial impact on rm's R&D investment.
We also examine the policy implications of nancial constraint on R&D investment, and the
regression results provide some evidence that the eect of tax credit is signicantly larger for
rms with relatively large outstanding debt, consistent with the nancial constraint channel
stated above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature.
Section 3 explains the 2003 tax credit reform in detail. Section 4 explains our data source and
present summary statistics. Section 5 develops a simple model of R&D expenditure featuring
tax credit and examine how tax credit aects R&D investment. Section 6 explains our empirical
framework and report estimation results.
2 Literature Review
The eectiveness of R&D tax credit has attracted increasing recent attention and been studied
extensively. Overall results suggest that the elasticity of R&D with respect to price is around 1.
In other words, one yen in tax credit for R&D stimulates around one yen of additional R&D. Hall
and Van Reenen (2000) survey 10 U.S. studies and 10 international studies on the econometric
evidence on the eectiveness of scal incentives for R&D. Based on U.S. studies, Hall and Van
Reenen (2000) conclude that \the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending during the 1980s
3is on the order of unity, maybe higher."
The results from more recent studies appear to support the conclusion by Hall and Van
Reenen (2000), at least qualitatively. Bloom, Grith and Van Reenen (2002) examine the
impact of scal incentives on the level of R&D investment using a panel of data on tax changes
and R&D spending in nine OECD countries over a 19-year period (1979-1997). Bloom et al.
(2002) estimate the following dynamic specication
rit = ri;t 1 + yit   it + fi + tt + uit;
where rit = log(industry-funded R&D); yit = log(output), it = log(user cost of R&D), fi is
a country-specic xed eect, and tt is a time dummy. Their estimate of  is 0.868, and  is
 0:144, implying a short-run and long-run elasticity of  0:144 and  1:088, respectively. This
estimate suggests that a 10% fall in the cost of R&D stimulates a 1.44% rise in R&D in the
short-run, and around a 10.1% rise in R&D in the long-run. A similar specication is used by
Hall (1993) and other studies reported below.
Pa (2005) estimates the tax price (user cost) elasticity of in-house (i.e., not contract) R&D
expenditure of biopharmaceutical and software rms in California by exploiting California's
changes in R&D tax credit rates during 1994-1996 and 1997-1999. The estimates by Pa (2005)
are substantially higher than unity, higher than 20 in some cases. Possible explanations in-
clude rms' greater sensitivity to state-level policy, industry factors, sample characteristics, and
measurement error.
Huang and Yang (2009) investigate the eect of tax incentives on R&D activities in Tai-
wanese manufacturing rms using a rm-level panel dataset from 2001 to 2005. Propensity
score matching reveals that, on average, recipients of R&D tax credits have 93.53% higher R&D
expenditures and a 14.47% higher growth rate for R&D expenditures than non-recipients with
similar characteristics. Huang and Yang (2009) estimate a panel xed eect model by a gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) and report that the estimated (short-run) elasticity of R&D
with respect to R&D tax credits is 0.197 for all rms, 0.149 for high-tech rms, and 0.081 for
non-high-tech rms.
Regarding the studies focused on the Japanese case, Koga (2003) examines the eectiveness
of R&D tax credits using data on 904 Japanese manufacturing rms over 10 years (1989-1998).
Koga (2003) nds evidence that tax price elasticity is  0:68 when estimated from all the rms
and  1:03 when estimated from large rms, using the R&D data from Research on R&D Ac-
tivities in Private Firms (Minkan kigyou no kenkyu katsudou ni kansuru chousa) by the Science
and Technology Agency supplemented by Nikkei Annual Corporation Reports (Nikkei Shinbun
Inc). Koga (2003) estimates the following dynamic specication
rit = yi;t 1   i;t 1 + fi + tt + uit;
4where rit = log(corporate R&D investment); yit = log(sales) and log(user cost of R&D), fi is a
rm-specic xed eect and tt is a time dummy. The estimate of  is  0:68 for all rms and
 1:03 for large rms. The coecient of lagged rit is reported to be insignicant.
Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) investigate the eect of the R&D tax credit reform in 2003 using
a dataset on 485 rms from Report on the Survey of Research and Development (Kagaku gijutu
kenkyu chousa) by the Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications. Using the propensity
score matching, Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) compare the change in the R&D expenditure from
2002 to 2003 between those rms who use the new total (Sougaku gata) tax credit system and
those rms who do not use the new tax credit system. It is found that those who use the new
Sougaku gata tax credit system increased their R&D expenditure by 1:2% while those who do
not use the new tax credit system decreased their R&D expenditure by 0:9%. Ohnishi and
Nagata (2010) conclude there is virtually no dierence in increase in the R&D expenditure
between those two groups of rms. The dataset of Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) is somewhat
peculiar. The rms are restricted to the respondents of Kagaku Gijyutu Kenkyuu Tyosa, which
may induce sample-selection bias. Further, in their data set Ohnishi and Nagata (2010) observe
little overall change in the R&D expenditure between 2002 and 2003, whereas in our dataset the
R&D expenditure increases more than 10% between 2002 and 2003.
Motohashi (2010) combines rm-level panel data for 1983-2005 from Report on the Survey
of Research and Development (Kagaku gijutu kenkyu chousa) and nancial data published by














+ 4taxit + 5taxi;t 1 + 6fi + 7tt;
where K is R&D capital stock constructed by the author, tax is the tax-adjusted cost of R&D,
f is a rm-specic xed eect, and t is a time dummy. The estimated long-run eect of unit
R&D cost reduction (= 1 + 2) is around -0.5.
Cash ow constraint has been documented to have a signicant eect on rms' R&D activity.
Because tax system aects after-tax cash ow, cash ow is a potentially important channel
through which business tax policies aect rms' R&D activity. Ogawa (2007) investigates the
extent to which outstanding debt aected rms' R&D activities during the 1990s using a panel
data set of Japanese manufacturing rms in research-intensive industries. Ogawa (2007) nds
that the ratio of debt to total assets had a signicant negative eect on R&D investment in the
late 1990s while the eect of the debt-asset ratio on R&D investment was insignicant in the
late 1980s.
Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) examine the role of cash ow and stock issues in nanc-
ing R&D expenditures. R&D is dicult to nance through debt because of problems associated
with proprietary information, highly uncertain returns, and lack of collateral value for R&D
5capital. Brown et al. (2009) found signicant eects of cash ow and external equity on R&D
expenditures of young high-tech rms. Their result suggests that young rms invest approxi-
mately 15% of additional equity funds in R&D.
3 R&D tax credit reform in 2003
This section explains a reform of Japanese R&D tax credit system in 2003.3 We measure the





where RDit denotes R&D expenditure of rm i in period t while Xit denotes the amount of tax
credit4. The tax reform of 2003 substantially change the amount of tax credit Xit each rm is
eligible to. Below we explain how to compute Xit before and after the tax reform.
We rst explain the tax credit prior to 2002, i.e., before the reform. Prior to 2002, Japanese
R&D tax policy is characterized by the incremental tax credit system. Denote the average of
rm i's R&D expenditure over the three years of the largest R&D expenditure in the last ve
years by RDit, and denote rm i's \special experimental research expenses" (Tokubetsu Shiken
Kenkyu Hi in Japanese) in year t by SRDit.5 Let Tit denote the amount of the corporate tax
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i2002 = 0:15maxfRDi2002   RDi2002;0gI(RDi2002 > maxfRDi2001;RDi2000g) + 0:06SRDi2002;
whereas I(x > y) represents an indicator function. When RDi2002  RDi2002 or the R&D
expenditure in 2002 is smaller than the last two year's R&D expenditure, a rm receives no
3We do not cover the R&D tax credit system for small or medium enterprises (Chusho kigyou gijutsu kiban
kyouka zeisei in Japanese). Small or medium rms can choose between Chusho kigyou gijutsu kiban kyouka zeisei
and the tax credit system described in this section. The R&D tax credit system for small or medium enterprises
denes small or medium enterprises by (i) rms with capital smaller than or equal to 100 million yen, (ii) rms
without stockholder's equity or contribution to capital, the number of employees is less than 1000, and (iii)
Agricultural cooperative and similar institutions.
4Japanese R&D tax credit system denes R&D expenditure as the sum of own and outsourced research and
development expenses net of the amount the given rm receives for commissioned R&D projects. We follow this
denition of R&D expenditure to compute tax credit in our data.
5[Need to add an explanation of Tokubetsu Shiken Kenkyu Hi here.]
6tax credit. Further, the amount of tax credit is roughly proportional to the dierence between
the current R&D expenditure and the past R&D expenditure (RDi2002   RDi2002). Thus, an
established R&D rm with a large R&D expenditure receives little tax credit if the rm's R&D
expenditure is constant over years while a new R&D rm with no past R&D experiences may
receive up to 15 percent of the total amount of R&D expenditure as tax credit. Under this
incremental tax credit system, the larger the past R&D expenditure is, the smaller the amount
of tax credit a rm is eligible to.
In contrast, Japanese R&D tax policy after 2003 is characterized by the total tax credit
system, where a rm is potentially eligible to the amount of tax credit equal to 10{15 percent
of the R&D expenditure, regardless of the past R&D expenditure. Specically, the R&D tax
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(RDi2003=Y i2003)RDi2003 if RDi2003 is not classied as industry-university cooperation
0:15RDi2003 if RDi2003 is classied as industry-university cooperation:
with (x) = (0:2x + 0:1)I(x < 0:1) + 0:12I(x  0:1).
Table 1 reports the mean and the standard deviations for the changes in the eective rate of
tax credit, it = it   it 1, across rms for each year from 2000 to 2005. Looking at the year
2002-2003, we notice that the average eective rate of tax credit was increased by 9.27 percent
between 2002 and 2003, indicating the substantial impact of the 2003 tax credit reform on the
average eective rate of tax credit.7 In contrast, the average change in the eective rate of tax
credit is close to zero for years other than 2002-2003.
Moreover, because tax credit crucially depended on past R&D expenditures in the incremen-
tal tax system, and past R&D expenditures before 2002 were substantially dierent across rms,
the introduction of the total tax credit system induces heterogeneous changes in the eective
rate of tax credit across rms. Those rms who conduct large R&D investment before 2002
gain a large benet from the 2003 tax reform while those who did not conduct R&D investment
before 2002 gain little. In fact, as Table 2 reports, comparing across dierent quantiles of R&D
6From 2003 to 2005, rms were able to choose between the old incremental tax credit system and the new
total tax credit system. In the empirical analysis where we construct a proxy for the rate of tax credit, , we
take this aspect into account by taking the maximum of the tax credit in the incremental system and that in the
total system as the tax credit after 2003. However, the eect should be limited because the new total tax credit
system introduced in 2003 provides larger credit than the incremental system in most cases.
7Using data from the Corporation Sample Survey conducted by the National Tax Agency, Ohnishi and Nagata
(2010) report that the amount of aggregate tax credit after the 2003 tax credit reform is 6{11 times as large as
that before the reform.
7expenditures in 2002, we nd that the increase in the eective rate of tax credits between 2002
and 2003 is larger for the rms with the higher value of R&D expenditure in 2002. It is this
cross-sectional variation of changes in the eective rate of tax credit before and after the tax
reform that enables us to identify the eect of tax credit on R&D expenditure.
As shown in Table 1, the standard deviations of it before the year 2002 are much larger
than after the year 2003. For the period of 1999-2002, the standard deviations of it are
relatively high at 0.0304-0.0349, indicating that some rms experienced a substantial change in
the eective rate of tax credit while other rms did not when the incremental tax system was
in eect.
To understand the source of this cross-sectional variation in it, as an example, consider
a rm which started R&D activity in 2000 for the rst time. Since this rm's past R&D
expenditure before 2000 is equal to zero, this rm is eligible for tax credit of 15 percent of R&D
expenditure in 2000 as long as it is below the corporate tax the rm owes. Next year in 2001, this
rm faces the lower eective rate of tax credit than 15 percent because past R&D expenditure
in 2001 is not zero anymore. Thus, under the incremental tax system, the eective rate of tax
credit tends to decrease over time for a rst three years of R&D activity. On the other hand,
the eective rate of tax credit would be close to zero for the rms with more than three years
of R&D experience if they do not change the amount of R&D expenditures much across years.
Accordingly, the rm's past R&D experience is an important determinant of the eective
rate of tax credit before 2002. Table 3 shows the average eective rate of tax credit across
four groups of rms with positive R&D expenditure in 2002 classied according to their past
R&D experience over the last ve years: (1) no past experience in R&D, (2) one year of R&D
experience, (3) two years of R&D experience, and (4) more than three years of R&D experience.
The average eective rate of tax credit decreases with the years of R&D experience from 0.15
to 0.01.
On the other hand, after the introduction of the total tax credit system in 2003, most rms
experienced little change in the eective rate of tax credit, and there is little cross-sectional
variation in the values of it for 2003-2005.
4 Data
4.1 Data Source
We use data from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA)
conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This survey covers all
Japanese rms with 50 or more employees, whose paid-up capital or investment fund is over
30 million yen, and whose operation is classied as the mining, manufacturing, and wholesale
and retail trade, and eating and drinking places. It collects basic corporate nance data as
8well as detailed data on various business activities such as exports/imports and R&D activities.
This survey started in 1991, and has been conducted annually since 1994. All rms with the
characteristics stated above receive a survey questionnaire and report data for the last or most
recent accounting year.8 Response rates have been high and thus the size of the cross-section
sample has been large, consisting of 25,000{30,000 rms each year.9
4.2 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
We focus our attention on manufacturing rms. Further, we select a benchmark sample as
follows. First, we exclude observations of rms with capital smaller than or equal to 100 million
yen to focus on large rms. This is primarily because small or medium rms can choose between
the R&D tax credit system for small or medium enterprises and that for all rms and, thus,
including small or medium rms into the sample complicates our analysis substantially. [What
is a fraction of aggregate R&D investment explained by these small/medium rms?]
Second, we only keep observations of rms of which accounting year closes in March. The new
total tax credit system has become available for the accounting year that started after January
2003. Because the BSJBSA survey was conducted in June until 2007, in the 2004 BSJBSA
survey, any rm of which accounting year closes before June would report the data for the 2003
accounting year, and thus the new total tax credit system would apply to the accounting year of
the 2004 survey. In contrast, any rm of which accounting year closes after June would report
the data for the 2002 accounting year so that the old incremental tax credit system still applied.
By keeping observations of which accounting year closes in March, we essentially keep the former
groups of the rms in the sample in the benchmark analysis; a majority of Japanese rms close
their accounting year in March.
Third, because tax credit under the incremental system crucially depends on rm's R&D
expenditure over the past 5 years as described in Section 3, we reject observations missing past
R&D expenditure data. For the benchmark analysis, we exclude observations with more than
two years of missing R&D expenditure in the past ve years, because the incremental tax credit
system sets the base level to the average R&D expenditure over the selected three years in the
past ve years.10 Table 4 describes the benchmark sample selection in detail.
Table 5 reports summary statistics for the benchmark sample. Each entry except for the
last row refers to the average of the corresponding variable in the benchmark sample. The last
row reports the number of observations. Rows designated as `R&D Exp./Y' and `R&D Exp./N'
report averages of the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales and that to the number of employees,
8Survey questionnaires were sent out to rms in June until 2007 and the timing has been shifted to March
since 2008.
9For example, the response rate for the 2010 survey was 83.8%.
10We also tried alternative sample selections with respect to data on past R&D expenditure to check robustness.
[Robustness check]
9respectively. For those rows, the sample is restricted to the observations with strictly positive
R&D expenditure. `Asset' refers to the sum of liquid and xed assets. `Debt' refers to the sum
of liquid and xed debts. `Positive R&D' refers to the fraction of observations with strictly
positive R&D expenditure. [Need to include `Debt/Asset']
5 A R&D Investment Model with Financial Constraint
To understand how tax credits aect R&D expenditure, this section examines a simple two-
period model of R&D expenditure with nancial constraint. We denote the rst period by t and
the second period by t + 1.
 Consider prot function, t = (Kt;zt), where Kt represents the stock of R&D capital
and zt represents productivity that follows a rst-order Markov process with transition
distribution function F(zt+1jzt). Given zt, the support of F(jzt) is given by [z(zt);  z(zt)],
where z(zt) is increasing in zt.
 R&D expenditure is denoted by It while the law of motion for R&D capital stock is given
by Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + It, where  is depreciation rate.
 We assume quadratic capital adjustment costs and dene  (It;Kt) = It +

2(It=Kt)2Kt.
The quadratic adjustment cost of the form

2(It=Kt)2Kt captures the diculty in adjusting
the amount of R&D capital. Since a large portion of R&D spending is the wages and
salaries of highly educated scientists and engineers (see Lach and Schangerman (1989)),
the coecient  partly reects the degree of diculty in hiring and ring these knowledge
workers in the short period of time.
 We consider the following simplied tax credit systems before 2002 and after 2003. We
assume that the amount of tax credit for R&D expenditure is given by 't(It;It 1), where
't = 't(It;It 1) =
(
maxf0:15(It   It 1);0g if t  2002
maxf0:15It;0g if t  2003.
The total tax credit system after 2003 provides the larger amount of tax credits than the
incremental tax credit system before 2002, especially for the rms with a large amount of
past R&D expenditures.
 Firm's short term debt at the beginning of period t is denoted by bt. Here, bt refers to the
amount that the rm is supposed to repay in period t. The real interest rate is given by r.
105.1 A R&D investment model without nancial friction
To examine the eect of tax credit on R&D investment decision, consider a simple two period
investment model without nancial constraint:
max
It0




where p < 1    is the resale value of R&D capital.




E[(1   )K((1   )Kt + It;zt+1) + pjzt];
MC(It) = 0:85 + 
It
Kt




where MR(It) is the marginal revenue of R&D investment while MC and MC represent the
marginal cost of R&D investment when
@'t(It;It 1)
@It is equal to 0:15 and 0, respectively. Let I
and I be the optimal amount of R&D expenditure when the marginal costs are given by MC
and MC, respectively, so that MR(I) = MC(I) and MR(I) = MC(I).
Under the total tax credit system after 2003, the marginal cost function is given by MC(It) =
MC(It) and the optimal amount of R&D expenditure is given by It = I. On the other hand,
under the incremental tax credit system before 2002,
@'t(It;It 1)
@It is a discontinuous function of
It at It = It 1. As a result, the marginal cost function under the incremental tax credit system
is also discontinuous and given by
MC(It) =
(
MC(It) if It > It 1;
MC(It) if It  It 1:
Figures 1-3 illustrate how the amount of R&D expenditure is determined under the incremental
tax credit system. In Figure 1, when the past R&D expenditure is suciently low so that
It 1 < I, a rm benets from the tax credit by choosing this year's R&D expenditure above the
past year's R&D expenditure where the optimal R&D expenditure is determined by MR(It) =
MC(It). In contrast, in Figure 2, the past R&D expenditure is suciently high so that a rm's
optimal choice of R&D expenditure is lower than the past R&D expenditure; in this case, a rm
receives no tax credit. Figure 3 illustrates the intermediate case that I  It 1 < I, where a
rm chooses It = I only if it leads to a higher prot than a prot from choosing It = I. In
sum, the optimal R&D expenditure under the incremental tax credit system is given by
It =
(
I if It 1 < I or if I  It 1 < I and (I;Kt;It 1;zt) > (I;Kt;It 1;zt);
I if It 1  I or if I  It 1 < I and (I;Kt;It 1;zt)  (I;Kt;It 1;zt):
11The eect of tax reform may depend on the previous year's R&D expenditure. For example,
consider a rm whose previous year's R&D expenditure is suciently lower than this year's
\optimal" amount of R&D expenditure. In this case,
@'t(It;It 1)
@It = 0:15 for both tax regimes,
and the rm would choose the identical R&D expenditure across two dierent tax policies under
the optimality condition 0:85 + (It=Kt) =
1 
1+rE[K(Kt+1;zt+1) + pjzt]. Thus, for such rms,
the change from the incremental to the total tax credit system does not aect the decision rule
for R&D expenditure. This result follows because the optimal investment level is determined
by equating the marginal return to the marginal cost of R&D investment, and the tax credit
reform does not aect neither the marginal cost nor the marginal return as long as this year's
investment is larger than the last year's.
On the other hand, if a rm's optimal level of R&D expenditure is suciently lower than the
previous year's R&D expenditure, then the tax credit reform in 2003 may positively aect the
R&D expenditure. When a rm invests less than the previous year's in R&D (i.e., It < It 1),
a rm is not eligible to any tax credit under the incremental tax credit system. On the other
hand, under the total tax credit system, such a rm is eligible for 15 percent of tax credit. Thus,
the change from the incremental to the total tax credit system will decrease the marginal cost
of R&D investment by 15 percent and, as a result, the R&D expenditure will increase.
The model implies that the eect of tax credit reforms on R&D expenditure would be
heterogeneous across rms, and depends on the past R&D expenditures before 2002. The rms
with the large amount of R&D expenditures in 1997-2001 may experience a substantial change
in the eective rate of tax credit in 2003. In contrast, the eective rate of tax credit does not
change before and after the 2003 tax reform (given at 15 percent) for the rms without any
R&D investment in 1997-2001. We exploit this variation of the eective rate of tax credit across
rms in our empirical analysis.
5.2 A R&D investment model with nancial constraint
R&D is dicult to nance through debt because of problems associated with proprietary in-
formation, highly uncertain returns, and lack of collateral value for R&D capital. Because
the tax reform of 2003 may have a substantial impact on after-tax cash ow, the change from
the incremental to the total tax credit system may have had an impact on R&D expenditure
through relaxing rm's nancial constraint. To examine this issue, we extend a two period in-
vestment model by incorporating nancial constraint. See the analysis by Almeida, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004).
Consider a rm with state (bt;Kt;zt;It 1) in the rst period, where bt represents the out-
standing debt at the beginning of period t. We assume that, in the second period t + 1, this
rm is forced to sell itself after obtaining the prot.
12The dividend in the rst period is given by dt(Kt;It;It 1;zt;bt;bt+1) where
dt = (1   )(Kt;zt)    (It;Kt) + 't(It;It 1)   bt + bt+1=(1 + r); (4)
where r denotes the real interest rate. We assume that the rm faces nancial constraint such
that the maximum amount of bond it can issue is limited by the amount it can repay without
any possibility of default. This requires that the maximum amount of borrowing has to be less
than the worst possible prot plus the resale value of rm in the second period:
bt+1  (1   )(Kt+1;z(zt)) + pKt+1:
Further, we assume that a rm cannot raise funds by issuing equity: dt  0.11 Then, rm's






E[(1   )(Kt+1;zt+1) + pKt+1jzt] (5)
s.t. bt+1  (1   )(Kt+1;z(zt)) + pKt+1;
d(Kt;It;It 1;zt;bt;bt+1)  0:
When there exists such nancial constraint, the tax credit reform of 2003 may positively
aect the R&D investment by relaxing the nancial constraint. This can be seen from the budget
constraint in rm's R&D investment problem (5). The eect of tax reform is represented by the
change in the tax credit function 't(It;It 1). For any rm that conducted R&D investment in
the previous year (i.e., It 1 > 0), the tax credit 't(It;It 1) would be higher after tax reform
than before tax reform. As a result, the tax reform increases the R&D investment by increasing
the internal fund for R&D investment. The larger the amount of R&D investment before the
tax reform is, the larger the eect of tax reform on the current year's investment.
The essence of this argument can be understood by considering an extreme case of (Kt+1;z(zt)) =
0 and p = 0. The assumption that (Kt+1;z(zt)) = 0 implies that a rm might get zero prot
with some positive probability while p = 0 implies that the resale value of R&D capital is zero.
In this case, the nancial constraint is given by bt+1  0 so that there is no possibility of borrow-
ing. Since equity nancing is also assumed to be restricted, as a result, the maximum amount of
R&D expenditure a rm can possibly nance is limited by the internal cash ow. Specically,
the constraint d(Kt;It;It 1;zt;bt;bt+1)  0 implies that
It   I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt);
11The similar argument applies when we alternatively assume that there is a convex adjustment cost of issuing
equity.
13where  I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt) is dened by
(1   )(Kt;zt)    ( I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt);Kt) + 't( I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt);It 1)   bt = 0:
When the optimal R&D expenditure under no nancial constraint discussed in the previous
section is higher than  I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt), then the nancial constraint is binding and the R&D
expenditure under nancial constraint is  I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt). Since  I(zt;Kt;It 1;bt) is decreasing
in the amount of debt bt and the past R&D expenditure It 1, the R&D expenditure It is
decreasing in bt and It 1 when the constraint is binding.
The tax credit reform in 2003 increases the internal cash ow by 0:15It 1 and, as a result,
the reform may increase the R&D expenditure of nancially constrained rms as much as by
0:15It 1. The model implies that, the larger amount of debt bt a rm has, the more likely the
rm is to be nancially constrained. Therefore, we expect that the eect of the tax credit reform
in 2003 through a change in the eective tax credit rate would be increasing in the amount of
debt bt. This implication is tested in our empirical analysis by including the interaction term
between the debt-capital ratio and the eective tax credit rate in our specications.
6 Empirical Analysis
To examine the eect of tax credit on R&D investment, we estimate linear investment models
using the BSJBSA data. Our base model is as follows.12
lnRDit = it +  lnYit + i + t + it; (6)
where RDit is rm i's R&D expenditure in year t, it is the eective rate of R&D tax credit for
rm i's R&D expenditure in year t, Yit is the sales of rm i in year t. The term i captures rm
xed eects, t is time eects, and it is the unobservable shocks that aect rm i's decision of
R&D expenditure in year t. Our measure of R&D expenditure is the sum of own and outsourced
research and development expenses. Following the tax credit formulas described in Section 3,
we construct a measure for the eective rate of tax credit, it, dened by (1) using the BSJBSA
data on R&D expenditure and sales. There are two omissions because of lack of information in
the BSJBSA data. First, we do not take into account the fact that the credit is capped by a
certain fraction (12{20 percent) of the corporate tax, because the data on corporate tax is not
available in the BSJBSA data set. Second, we do not distinguish Tokubetsu Shiken Kenkyu Hi
from other types of R&D expenditures.
Since we are interested in the eect of the change in the tax credit policies between 2002
and 2003, and to control for endogeneity due to the rm-specic eects i, we take the rst
12Our specication is similar to that in Bloom, Grith, and Van Reenen (2002).
14dierence of (6) to obtain:
lnRDit = it + lnYit + t + it: (7)
This is our basic econometric specication.
As we discussed in the previous section, the shift from the incremental to the total tax credit
system in 2003 may increase R&D investment for nancially constrained rms with insucient
internal funds. To examine whether the nancial constraint matters for R&D investment or not,
we incorporate a debt to asset ratio that partially account for the cross-sectional variation in
rm's internal funds into the above model. Specically, we include the level of a debt to asset
ratio as a proxy for nancial constraint as well as its interaction with the eective rate of tax
credit in equation (6) as






+ i + t + it: (8)
where bit and Kit represent rm i's outstanding debt and xed asset in the beginning of year
t, respectively. We use the sum of liquid and xed debt for bit and the stock of xed asset for
Kit.13 We also estimate the rst-dierence version of (8):











+ t + it: (9)
The positive value of  implies that the eect of tax credit reform in 2003 is especially large for
the rms with a higher debt to asset ratio. To the extent that the higher debt to asset ratio
leads to a tighter nancial constraint, the positive value of  can be interpreted as evidence that
the 2003 tax credit reform promoted R&D expenditures of nancially constrained rms.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 report the results from the rst dierence regressions (7)
and (9), respectively. In column (1), the estimated coecient of it is signicantly positive at
2.33, indicating that the elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to the eective rate of tax
credit is 2.33 percent. Column (2) reports the estimates of the rst-dierenced equation with
debt-to-asset ratio (9). The coecient of it is close to that in column (1). The estimated
coecient of bit=Kit is signicantly negative, suggesting that an increase in the debt-to-asset
ratio is correlated with a decline in the R&D expenditure between 2002 and 2003. One possible
interpretation of this result is that a rm with the higher debt-to-asset ratio may face a tighter
nancial constraint for R&D investment. On the other hand, the estimated coecient of the
interaction term itbit=Kit is signicantly positive, indicating that the positive eect of the
2003 tax credit reform on R&D expenditure is especially large for rms that faces nancial
13Data on Kit are constructed by the perpetual inventory method with the depreciation rate of 0.08. We
multiply by 4 the book value of the xed asset and use it for the initial value in the perpetual inventory method.
15constraint. The median, 75 percentile, and 90 percentile of bit=Kit are 0.6, 1.0, 1.6, respectively.
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 6 compares the eect of the eective tax credit rate on small
and large rms. Because smaller rms are more likely to face a tighter nancial constraint, it
is expected that the eect of tax credit is larger for smaller rms than larger rms. To this
end, we split the sample at the median of the xed asset and estimate equations (7) and (9)
separately for each sample. Columns (3)-(4) report the results for small rms, and columns
(5)-(6) report the results for large rms. The coecient of it is larger in columns (3)-(4) than
in columns in (5)-(6). Further, the estimated coecient of the terms bit=Kit and itbit=Kit
are signicant in columns (3)-(4) but not in columns in (5)-(6). There results corroborate our
theoretical prediction in Section 5, and suggests that the 2003 tax credit reform promoted R&D
expenditures of small and nancially constrained rms.
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18Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviations of it for each year from 2000 to 2005
Year 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005
Mean of it -0.0019 -0.0050 -0.0024 0.0921 -0.0005 -0.0006
S.D. of it 0.0334 0.0349 0.0304 0.0303 0.0060 0.0061
No. of Observations 2124 2139 2111 1915 1897 1929
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mean of it 0.0167 0.0143 0.0134 0.1061 0.1063 0.1062
S.D. of it 0.0349 0.0322 0.0311 0.0079 0.0083 0.0081
No. of Observations 2352 2384 2301 2060 2143 2098
Notes. The benchmark sample is used. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
Table 2: Eective Rate of Tax Credit and Past R&D Expenditure
RDi2002 <= p25 (p25;p50] (p50;p75] > p75
Mean of i2003 0.0744 0.0935 0.0977 0.1028
(0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Notes. Row designated by Mean of i2003 reports the sample average of the change in the eective rate of tax
credit in the benchmark sample for 2003, conditional on the reference level for tax credit, RDi2002, in the 2002
incremental tax credit system. Standard errors are in parentheses. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business
Structure and Activities)
19Table 3: Mean of it in 2002 and Past R&D experience
Past R&D experience (1) zero year (2) one year (3) two years (4) three years
Mean of it 0.1500 0.0694 0.0352 0.0099
S.D. of it 0.0000 0.0621 0.0493 0.0233
No. of Observations 31 27 67 1811
Notes. The benchmark sample is used. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
Table 4: Benchmark Sample Selection
Observations Remaining
deleted observations
Original sample (manufacturing) 204091
Small or medium rms 126800 77291
Accounting year closed not in March 26003 51288
Missing past R&D 11772 39516
Notes. `Small or medium rms' excludes observations of rms with capital smaller than or equal to 100 million.
For each year, `missing past R&D' excludes observations with more than two years of missing R&D expenditure in
the past ve years prior to the given year. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
20Table 5: Mean Characteristics of Benchmark Sample
2001 2002 2003 2004
Sales (Y) 51477.40 53206.35 56266.52 58242.46
Net Prot -133.53 685.04 1254.95 1533.89
# Employee (N) 903.37 878.58 907.91 897.50
Fixed Asset (K) 55920.41 52052.67 50065.44 47428.68
Debt (b) 36721.37 35111.96 35389.48 35094.14
b/K 1.0315 1.2258 1.3676 1.3194
R&D Expenditure 2334.37 2316.04 2436.00 2461.01
R&D Exp./Y 0.0281 0.0272 0.0266 0.0260
R&D Exp./N 1.1597 1.1918 1.2258 1.2574
Positive R&D 0.7010 0.6941 0.6915 0.7000
Observation 3438 3348 3287 3390
Notes. Each entry except for the last row refers to the average of the corresponding variable in the benchmark
sample. The last row reports the number of observations. Rows designated as `R&D Exp./Y' and `R&D Exp./N'
report averages of the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales and that to the number of employees, respectively. For
those rows, the sample is restricted to the observations with strictly positive R&D expenditure. `Fixed Asset'
refers to the xed asset in the beginning of the period. `Debt' refers to the sum of liquid and xed debts in
the beginning of the period. `Positive R&D' refers to the fraction of observations with strictly positive R&D
expenditure. All monetary values are nominal and in units of million yen. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese
Business Structure and Activities)
Table 6: Regression Results (t = 2003)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 2.3304*** 1.9616*** 3.3205*** 2.7608*** 1.2380 1.1424
[0.619] [0.624] [0.776] [0.731] [1.139] [1.163]
lnYit 0.5518*** 0.5191*** 0.5051** 0.3898** 0.6455*** 0.6193***
[0.110] [0.109] [0.200] [0.194] [0.104] [0.110]
 bit










Constant -0.2235*** -0.2078*** -0.2764*** -0.2521*** -0.1431 -0.1426
[0.060] [0.061] [0.069] [0.066] [0.116] [0.116]
Observations 1,915 1,860 776 768 1,103 1,092
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression equations are given by equations (7) and (9). The rst
dierence is taken between 2002 and 2003. Robust standard errors are in brackets. (Source: Basic Survey of
Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
21Appendix
Table 7: GMM Estimation (t = 2003)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 1:6806 0:8829 5:5706 3:4898  2:1821  1:4140
[2:0140] [1:7374] [3:2351] [2:3219] [2:4421] [2:1050]
lnYit 0:6043   0:5566   0:6253   0:4791   0:6299   0:6104  
[0:1038] [0:1030] [0:2000] [0:1901] [0:0960] [0:1051]
 bit








0:2073   0:2172    0:4715
[0:0140] [0:0165] [0:3332]
Constant  0:1710  0:1138  0:4958  0:3314 0:1841 0:1383
[0:1940] [0:1694] [0:3007] [0:2192] [0:2420] [0:2142]
p-value of the test of 0.8787 0.2327 0.9180 0.3181 0.7564 0.9743
overidentifying restriction
Observations 1716 1676 676 670 1014 1006
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2
Kit 2 ,











Robust standard errors are in brackets. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
22Table 8: Regression Results (t = 2003, with cap)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 0.1891 -0.1312 0.5904 0.1182 -0.1583 -0.3451
[0.320] [0.319] [0.556] [0.539] [0.379] [0.488]
lnYit 0.5311*** 0.5105*** 0.4598*** 0.3673** 0.6436*** 0.6176***
[0.092] [0.092] [0.158] [0.154] [0.109] [0.112]
 bit










Constant -0.0213 -0.0112 -0.0230 -0.0088 -0.0135 -0.0149
[0.027] [0.026] [0.046] [0.044] [0.032] [0.032]
Observations 1,915 1,860 776 768 1,103 1,092
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression equations are given by equations (7) and (9). The rst
dierence is taken between 2002 and 2003. Robust standard errors are in brackets. (Source: Basic Survey of
Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
Table 9: Regression Results (t = 2003, Positive Prot)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 2.5501*** 2.6835*** 3.8545*** 4.3465*** 1.1386 0.8413
[0.728] [0.807] [0.932] [1.030] [1.257] [1.280]
lnYit 0.5740*** 0.5642*** 0.5561* 0.4866* 0.6593*** 0.6150***
[0.159] [0.164] [0.286] [0.289] [0.157] [0.170]
 bit










Constant -0.2202*** -0.2342*** -0.3140*** -0.3474*** -0.1054 -0.1111
[0.072] [0.076] [0.084] [0.088] [0.128] [0.128]
Observations 1,353 1,312 536 532 790 780
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression equations are given by equations (7) and (9). The rst
dierence is taken between 2002 and 2003. Robust standard errors are in brackets. (Source: Basic Survey of
Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
23Table 10: GMM Estimation (t = 2000   2003)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 3:3848   3:1210   4:7624   4:6577   1:2837 1:5742
[1:5614] [1:4341] [2:1478] [1:9110] [2:3539] [2:3423]
lnYit 0:4392   0:4258   0:4035   0:3715   0:4814   0:4819  
[0:0555] [0:0551] [0:0853] [0:0838] [0:0653] [0:0660]
 bit








0:2284   0:2270    0:8287
[0:0187] [0:0172] [0:4430]
Y ear2001 0:0361 0:0391   0:0223 0:0181 0:0492   0:0311
[0:0196] [0:0199] [0:0384] [0:0390] [0:0219] [0:0336]
Y ear2002  0:0238  0:0247  0:0677  0:0653 0:0041 0:0043
[0:0204] [0:0205] [0:0398] [0:0400] [0:0226] [0:0228]
Y ear2003  0:3075    0:3061    0:4130    0:4383    0:1176  0:0916
[0:1528] [0:1414] [0:2055] [0:1846] [0:2344] [0:2325]
Constant  0:0208  0:0208  0:0038  0:0023  0:0337    0:0327  
[0:0138] [0:0138] [0:0272] [0:0272] [0:0153] [0:0154]
p-value of the test of 0.1287 0.1280 0.4151 0.3933 0.2011 0.3799
overidentifying restriction
Observations 7049 6938 2687 2668 4283 4270
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): Y ear2001, Y ear2002,
Y ear2003, lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2











Kit 2, constant. Robust standard errors are in brack-
ets. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
24Table 11: GMM Estimation (t = 2000   2003, with cap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 1:7895 2:0482 3:5311 3:3992 0:7663 1:0004
[2:2416] [2:2507] [2:9905] [2:9905] [2:4594] [2:3694]
lnYit 0:4417   0:4162   0:3936   0:3605   0:4807   0:4910  
[0:0697] [0:0689] [0:1052] [0:1048] [0:0701] [0:0768]
 bit








0:2289   0:2221    1:4582
[0:0205] [0:0171] [1:5981]
Y ear2001 0:0392 0:0426   0:0279 0:0263 0:0481   0:0293
[0:0204] [0:0205] [0:0401] [0:0407] [0:0223] [0:0366]
Y ear2002  0:0238  0:0263  0:0716  0:0703 0:0036 0:0054
[0:0212] [0:0212] [0:0419] [0:0421] [0:0227] [0:0230]
Y ear2003  0:1099  0:1462  0:2142  0:2313  0:0516 0:0040
[0:1643] [0:1653] [0:2145] [0:2155] [0:1835] [0:2362]
Constant  0:0251  0:0240  0:0093  0:0075  0:0329    0:0335  
[0:0143] [0:0142] [0:0284] [0:0284] [0:0156] [0:0157]
p-value of the test of 0.1687 0.2160 0.6800 0.4925 0.0894 0.1931
overidentifying restriction
Observations 7049 6938 2687 2668 4283 4270
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): Y ear2001, Y ear2002,
Y ear2003, lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2











Kit 2, constant. Robust standard errors are in brack-
ets. (Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
25Table 12: GMM Estimation (t = 2000   2003, Positive Prot)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit lnRDit
SAMPLE Benchmark Benchmark Small K Small K Large K Large K
it 2:8898 3:1598 4:7682 5:2439   1:8498 1:9804
[1:8578] [1:6175] [2:5623] [2:1783] [2:2458] [2:3506]
lnYit 0:4837   0:4554   0:3683   0:3304   0:5929   0:5901  
[0:0880] [0:0864] [0:1308] [0:1248] [0:0957] [0:0974]
 bit










Y ear2001 0:0303 0:0326  0:0183  0:0238 0:0562   0:0165
[0:0258] [0:0282] [0:0509] [0:0540] [0:0267] [0:0425]
Y ear2002 0:0216 0:0217  0:0120  0:0119 0:0427 0:0425
[0:0258] [0:0256] [0:0513] [0:0511] [0:0259] [0:0261]
Y ear2003  0:2525  0:3030  0:4248  0:4959    0:1577  0:1449
[0:1807] [0:1579] [0:2448] [0:2076] [0:2232] [0:2228]
Constant  0:0022  0:0003 0:0393 0:0429  0:0271  0:0272
[0:0182] [0:0181] [0:0368] [0:0363] [0:0186] [0:0184]
p-value of the test of 0.1551 0.2262 0.7106 0.7645 0.0846 0.1795
overidentifying restriction
Observations 4324 4258 1653 1641 2627 2617
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments are: col.(1), col.(3), col.(5): Y ear2001, Y ear2002,
Y ear2003, lnYit, it 2, it 3,
RDit 2











Kit 2, constant. Robust standard errors are in brack-






























Figure 3: R&D Investment Decision when I**<I
t-1<I* 
I
t = I*  if  Π(I*)>Π(I**)
I*
29